



California Institute of Technology
Centre for Economic Policy Research
William R. Zame†
UCLA
California Institute of Technology
March 15, 2005
∗Financial support from the R. G. Jenkins Family Fund and the National Science Foun-
dation is gratefully acknowledged. Opinions, ﬁndings, conclusions and recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views
of any funding agency.
†Financial support from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Na-
tional Science Foundation, the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory at Caltech, and
the UCLA Academic Senate Committee on Research is gratefully acknowledged. Opin-
ions, ﬁndings, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this material are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of any funding agency.Abstract
This paper reports ﬁndings from a series of laboratory asset mar-
kets. Although stakes in the experiment are modest, the data display
clear evidence of substantial risk aversion. Most obviously, asset prices
imply a substantial equity premium: risky assets are priced substan-
tially below their expected payoﬀs. Moreover, the diﬀerences between
expected asset payoﬀs and asset prices are in the direction predicted
by standard asset-pricing theory: assets with higher beta have higher
returns. The data yield estimatse of the Sharpe ratio of the market in
the range 0.2−1.7 (the Sharpe ratio of the New York Stock Exchange
is approximately .43), and CAPM yields estimates of the market abso-
lute risk aversion on the order of 10−3. This work suggests useful ways
to separate the eﬀects of risk aversion from competing explanations in
other experimental environments.1 Introduction
Forty years of econometric tests have provided only weak support for the
predictions of asset pricing models. (See Davis, Fama & French (2000) for
instance.) However, it is diﬃcult to know where the problems in such models
lie, or how to improve them, because basic parameters of the theories —
including the market portfolio, the true distribution of asset returns, the
information available to investors — cannot be observed in the historical
record. Laboratory tests of these theories are appealing because these basic
parameters (and others) can be observed accurately — or even controlled.
However, most asset pricing theories rest on the assumption that individuals
are risk averse.1 Because risks and rewards in laboratory experiments are
(almost of necessity) small (in comparison to subjects’ lifetime wealth, or
even current wealth), the degree of risk aversion observable in the laboratory
might be so small as to be undetectable in the unavoidable noise, which
would present an insurmountable problem.
This paper reports ﬁndings from a series of laboratory asset markets that
bely this concern: despite relatively small risks and rewards, the eﬀects of risk
aversion are detectable and signiﬁcant. Most obviously, asset prices imply
a signiﬁcant equity premium: risky assets are priced signiﬁcant below their
expected payoﬀs. Moreover, the diﬀerences between expected asset payoﬀs
and returns (payoﬀs per unit of investment) are in the direction predicted by
standard asset-pricing theory: assets with higher beta have higher returns.
As a quantitative expression of the degree of risk aversion, we obtain esti-
mates of Sharpe ratios of the market in the range 0.2−1.7 (the Sharpe ratio of
the NYSE is approximately 0.43), and, using CAPM, we estimate the market
absolute risk aversion to be approximately 10−3. Our work suggests useful
ways to distinguish the eﬀects of risk aversion from subject errors, quantal
response equilibrium, etc. in a number of experimental environments.
1Here we refer to theories such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964)
that predict the prices of fundamental assets, rather than to theories such as the pricing
formula of Black & Scholes (1973) that predict the prices of options or other derivative
assets. The latter theories do not rest on assumptions about investor risk attitudes, but
rather on the absence of arbitrage.
1In our laboratory markets, 30 - 60 subjects trade one riskless and two risky
securities (whose dividends depend on the state of nature) and cash. Each
experiment is divided into 6-9 periods. At the beginning of each period,
subjects are endowed with a portfolio of securities and cash. During the
period, subjects trade through a continuous, web-based open-book system
(a form of double auction that keeps track of infra-marginal bids and oﬀers).
After a pre-speciﬁed time, trading halts, the state of nature is drawn, and
subjects are paid according to their terminal holdings. The entire situation
is repeated in each period but the state of nature is drawn anew at the
end of each period. Subjects know the dividend structure (the payoﬀ of each
security in each state of nature) and the probability that each state will occur,
and of course they know their own holdings and their own attitudes toward
wealth and risk. They also have access to the history of orders and trades.
Subjects do not know the number of participants in any given experiment,
nor the holdings of other participants, nor the market portfolio.
Typical earnings in a single experiment (lasting 2+ hours) are $50-100
per subject. Although this is a substantial wage for some subjects, it is
small in comparison to lifetime wealth, or indeed to current wealth (the pool
of subjects consists of undergraduates and MBA students). Small rewards
suggest approximately risk neutral behavior, asset prices nearly coincident
with expected payoﬀs, little incentive to trade, and hence little trade at all.
However, our experimental data are inconsistent with these implications
of risk neutrality; rather the data suggest signiﬁcant risk aversion. Most obvi-
ously, market prices are below expected returns, and substantial trade takes
place. Moreover, assets with higher beta have higher returns (lower prices), as
suggested by standard asset pricing theories. Quantitative measures of risk
aversion are provided by the Sharpe ratios of the market portfolio, which
are in the range 0.2 − 1.7 — on the same order as the Sharpe ratio of the
New York Stock Exchange (computed on the basis of yearly data), which is
0.43 — and the imputed market risk aversion derived from CAPM, which is
approximately 10−3.
Following this Introduction, Section 2 describes our experimental asset
markets, Section 3 presents the data generated by these experiments and
2the relationship of these data to standard asset pricing theories. Section 4
suggests implications of our experiments for the design and interpretation of
other experiments where risk aversion may play a role, and concludes.
32 Experimental Design
In our laboratory markets the objects of trade are assets (state-dependent
claims to wealth at the terminal time) A, B, N (Notes) and Cash. Notes are
riskless and can be held in positive or negative amounts (can be sold short);
assets A,B are risky and can only be held in non-negative amounts (cannot
be sold short).
Each experimental session of approximately 2 hours is divided into 6-9
periods, lasting 15-20 minutes. At the beginning of a period, each subject
(investor) is endowed with a portfolio of assets and Cash; the endowment of
risky assets and Cash are non-negative, the endowment of Notes is negative
(representing a loan that must be repaid). During the period, the market
is open and assets may be traded for Cash. Trades are executed through
an electronic open book system (a continuous double auction). During the
period, while the market is open, no information about the state of nature is
revealed, and no credits are made to subject accounts; in eﬀect, consumption
takes place only at the close of the market. At the end of each period, the
market closes, the state of nature is drawn, payments on assets are made, and
dividends are credited to subject accounts. (In some experiments, subjects
were also given a bonus upon completion of the experiment.) Accounting in
these experiments is in a ﬁctitious currency called francs, to be exchanged
for dollars at the end of the experiment at a pre-announced exchange rate.
Subjects whose cumulative earnings at the end of a period are not suﬃcient
to repay their loan are bankrupt; subjects who are bankrupt for two consec-
utive trading periods are barred from trading in future periods.2 In eﬀect,
therefore, consumption in a given period can be negative.
Subjects know their own endowments, and are informed about asset pay-
oﬀs in each of the 3 states of nature X,Y,Z, and of the objective probability
distribution over states of nature. We use two treatments of uncertainty. In
the ﬁrst treatment, states of nature for each period are drawn independently
with probabilities 1/3,1/3,1/3; randomization is achieved by using a random
number generator or by drawing with replacement from an urn containing
2However, the bankruptcy rule was seldom triggered.
4equal numbers of balls representing each state. In the second treatment,
balls, marked with the state, are drawn without replacement from an urn
initially containing 18 balls, 6 for each state. (Subjects are informed of the
procedure.) Asset payoﬀs are shown in Table 1 (1 unit of Cash is 1 franc in
each state of nature), and the remaining parameters for each experiment are
shown in Table 2. (Experiments are identiﬁed by year-month-day.)
In all experiments, subjects were given complete instructions, including
descriptions of some portfolio strategies (but no suggestions as to which
strategies to choose). Complete instructions and other details are available
at http//eeps3.caltech.edu/market-011126; use anonymous login, ID 1, pass-
word a.
Table 1: Asset Payoﬀs
State X Y Z
A 170 370 150
B 160 190 250
N 100 100 100
Subjects are not informed of the endowments of others, or of the market
portfolio (the social endowment of all assets), or the number of subjects, or
whether these are the same from one period to the next. The information
provided to subjects parallels the information available to participants in
stock markets such as the New York Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse.
We are especially careful not to provide information about the market port-
folio, so that subjects cannot easily deduce the nature of aggregate risk —
lest they attempt to use a standard model (such as CAPM) to predict prices,
rather than to take observed prices as given. Keep in mind that neither
general equilibrium theory nor asset pricing theory require that participants
have any more information than is provided in these experiments. Indeed,
much of the power of these theories comes precisely from the fact that agents
know only market prices and their own preferences and endowments.
Keep in mind that the social endowment (the market portfolio), the dis-
tribution of endowments, and the set of subjects and hence preferences diﬀer
5Table 2: Experimental Parameters
Date Draw Subject Bonus Endowments Cash Exchange
Type a Category Reward A B Notesb Rate
(Number) (franc) (franc) $/franc
981007 I 30 0 4 4 -19 400 0.03
981116 I 23 0 5 4 -20 400 0.03
21 0 2 7 -20 400 0.03
990211 I 8 0 5 4 -20 400 0.03
11 0 2 7 -20 400 0.03
990407 I 22 175 9 1 -25 400 0.03
22 175 1 9 -24 400 0.04
991110 I 33 175 5 4 -22 400 0.04
30 175 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
991111 I 22 175 5 4 -22 400 0.04
23 175 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011114 D 21 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
12 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011126 D 18 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
18 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
011205 D 17 125 5 4 -22 400 0.04
17 125 2 8 -23.1 400 0.04
aI: states are drawn independently across periods; D: states are drawn without replacement, starting
from a population of 18 balls, six of each type (state).
bAs discussed in the text, endowment of Notes includes loans to be repaid at the end of the period.
6across experiments. Indeed, because preferences may be aﬀected by earnings
during the experiment, the possibility of bankruptcy, and the time to the
end of the experiment, preferences may even be diﬀerent across periods in
the same experiment. Because equilibrium prices and choices depend on all
of these, and because of the inevitable noise present in every experiment,
there is every reason to expect equilibrium prices and choices to be diﬀerent
across experiments or even across diﬀerent periods in a given experiment.
Most of the subjects in these experiments had some knowledge of eco-
nomics in general and of ﬁnancial economics in particular: Caltech under-
graduates had taken a course in introductory ﬁnance, Claremont and Occi-
dental undergraduates were taking economics and/or econometrics classes,
and MBA students are exposed to various courses in ﬁnance. In one ex-
periment (011126), subjects were undergraduates at the University of Soﬁa
(Bulgaria), and were perhaps less knowledgeable about economics and ﬁ-
nance.
73 Findings
Because all trading is done through a computerized continuous double auc-
tion, we can observe and record every transaction — indeed, every oﬀer —
but we focus on end-of-period prices: that is, the prices of the last transac-
tion in each period.3 Because no uncertainty is resolved while the market is
open, it is natural to organize the data using a static model of asset trading:
investors trade assets before the state of nature is known, assets yield divi-
dends and consumption takes place after the state of nature is revealed (see
Arrow & Hahn (1971) or Radner (1972)).4
Because Notes and Cash are both riskless, we simplify slightly and treat
them as redundant assets.5 We therefore model our environment as involving
trade in risky assets A,B and a one riskless asset N (notes). Assets are claims
to consumption in each of the three possible states of nature X,Y,Z. Write
divA for the state-dependent dividends of asset A, divA(s) for dividends in
state s, and so forth. If θ = (θA,θB,θN) ∈ IR
3 is a portfolio of assets, we
write
divθ = θA(divA) + θB(divB) + θN(divN)
for the state-dependent dividends on the portfolio θ.






+ × IR of risky and riskless assets, and a strictly concave,
strictly monotone utility function Ui : IR
3 → IR deﬁned over state-dependent
terminal consumptions. (To be consistent with our experimental design, we
allow consumption to be negative but we require holdings of A,B to be non-
negative.) Investors care only about consumption, so given asset prices q,
investor i chooses a portfolio θi to maximize divθi subject to the budget
3See Asparouhova, Bossaerts & Plott (2003) and Bossaerts & Plott (2004) for discussion
of the evolution of prices during the experiment.
4Because there is only one good, there is no trade in commodities, hence no trade after
the state of nature is revealed.
5In fact, Cash and Notes are not quite perfect substitutes because all transactions must
take place through Cash, so that there is a transaction value to Cash. As Table 3 shows,
however, Cash and Notes are nearly perfect substitutes at the ends of most periods in
most experiments.
8constraint q · θi ≤ q · ωi.
An equilibrium consists of asset prices q ∈ IR
3
++ and portfolio choices
θi ∈ IR
2
+ × IR for each investor such that
• choices are budget feasible: for each i
q · θ
i ≤ q · ω
i






i) ⇒ q · ϕ > q · ω
i









In the following subsections, we show ﬁrst, that observed prices are gen-
erally below risk neutral prices, which implies risk aversion; second, that risk
aversion is systematic; third that the eﬀects of risk aversion can be quantiﬁed;
and fourth, that risk aversion can be estimated.
3.1 Risk Neutral Pricing and Observed Pricing
Risk neutrality for investor i means that Ui(x) = E(x) (where the ex-
pectation is taken with respect to the true probabilities. If all investors
are risk neutral then (normalizing so that the price of Cash is 1 and the
price of Notes is 100), the unique equilibrium price is the risk-neutral price
q = (E(A),E(B),E(N)) = (E(A),E(B),100).
Table 3 displays end-of-period prices in 72 periods across 9 experiments:
the end-of-period price of asset A is below its expectation in 64 periods,
equal to its expectation in 5 periods, above its expectation in 3 periods; the
end-of-period price of asset B is below its expectation in 64 periods, equal
to its expectation in 3 periods, above its expectation in 5 periods.
9Table 3: End-Of-Period Transaction Prices
Date Seca Period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
981007 A 220/230b 216/230 215/230 218/230 208/230 205/230
B 194/200 197/200 192/200 192/200 193/200 195/200
Nc 95d 98 99 97 99 99
981116 A 215e 203 210 211 185 201
B 187 194 195 193 190 185
N 99 100 98 100 100 99
990211 A 219 230 220 201 219 230 240
B 190 183 187 175 190 180 200
N 96 95 95 98 96 99 97
990407 A 224 210 205 200 201 213 201 208
B 195 198 203 209 215 200 204 220
N 99 99 100 99 99 99 99 99
991110 A 203 212 214 214 210 204
B 166 172 180 190 192 189
N 96 97 97 99 98 101
991111 A 225 217 225 224 230 233 215 209
B 196 200 181 184 187 188 188 190
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
011114 A 230/230 207/225 200/215 210/219 223/223 226/228 233/234 246/242 209/228
B 189/200 197/203 197/204 200/207 189/204 203/208 211/212 198/208 203/210
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 98 99
011126 A 180/230 175/222 195/226 183/217 200/220 189/225 177/213 190/219
B 144/200 190/201 178/198 178/198 190/201 184/197 188/198 175/193
N 93 110 99 100 98 99 102 99
011205 A 213/230 212/235 228/240 205/231 207/237 232/242 242/248 255/257 229/246
B 195/200 180/197 177/194 180/194 172/190 180/192 190/195 185/190 185/190
N 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 100
aSecurity.
bEnd-of-period transaction price/expected payoﬀ.
cNotes.
dFor Notes, end-of-period transaction prices only are displayed. Payoﬀ equals 100.
eEnd-of-period transaction prices only are displayed. Expected payoﬀs are as in 981007. Same for
990211, 990407, 991110 and 991111.
10Indeed, in many experiments, all or nearly all transactions take place at a
price below the asset expectation. For example, Figure 1 records all the pur-
chases/sales of assets throughout the 8 periods of an experiment conducted
on November 26, 2001: all of the more than 500 trades of the risky assets
take place at a price below the assets’ expected payoﬀs.
3.2 Prices and Betas
Subsection 3.1 shows that asset prices are below risk neutral prices, which
implies risk aversion on the part of subjects. To see that the eﬀect of risk
aversion is systematic, we examine expected returns and asset betas.






The beta of a portfolio θ is the ratio of the covariance of θ with the market




Given prices q, the expected rate of return of a portfolio θ is E(divθ/q · θ).
Most asset pricing theories predict that assets with higher betas should
have higher expected rates of return. (For example, the Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model predicts E(divθ/q · θ) − 1 = β(θ)[E(divM/q · M) − 1].) In our
laboratory markets, asset A always has higher beta than asset B so should
have higher expected rated of return. Figure 2 plots the diﬀerence in ex-
pected rates of return (expected rate of return of A minus expected rate of
return of B) against the diﬀerence in betas (beta of A minus beta of B) for
all 67 observations (all periods of all experiments). As the reader can see,
the diﬀerence in expected rate of return is positive roughly 75% of the time.
Applying a binomial test to the data yields a z-score of 8, so the correlation
is very unlikely to be accidental.





















Figure 1: Transaction prices in experiment 011126







































Figure 2: Diﬀerences of Betas vs Diﬀerences of Expected Returns
133.3 Sharpe Ratios
The data discussed above show that asset prices in our laboratory asset
markets reﬂect signiﬁcant risk aversion; Sharpe ratios provide a useful way
to quantify the eﬀect of this risk aversion. Given asset prices q, the excess
rate of return is the diﬀerence between the rate of return on θ and the rate of
return on the riskless asset. In our context, the rate of return on the riskless
asset is 1, so the excess rate of return on the portfolio θ is E[div θ/q ·θ]−1.
By deﬁnition, the Sharpe ratio of θ is the ratio of its excess return to its
volatility:
Sh(θ) =
E[divθ/q · θ] − 1
q
var(divθ/q · θ)
In particular, the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio M is
Sh(M) =
E[divM/q · M] − 1
q
var(divM/q · M)
If investors were risk neutral, asset prices would equal expected dividends,
so the numerator would be 0, and the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio
(indeed of every portfolio) would be 0. Roughly speaking, increasing risk
aversion leads to lower equilibrium prices and hence to a higher Sharpe ratio
(as we see below, CAPM leads to a precise statement), so the Sharpe ratio
is a quantitative — although indirect — measure of market risk aversion.
As Figure 3 shows, except for one outlier, Sharpe ratios in our laboratory
markets are in the range 0.2 − 1.7, clustering in the range 0.4 − 0.6. For
comparison, recall that the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio of stocks
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (computed on yearly data) is about
.43. (Keep in mind that risks and rewards on the NYSE are enormously
greater than in our experiments, so similar Sharpe ratios do not translate




























Figure 3: Sharpe Ratios: All Periods, All Experiments
153.4 CAPM
An alternative approach to quantifying the risk aversion in our laboratory
markets is to use a particular asset pricing model to impute the market risk
aversion. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) is
particularly well-suited to this exercise.
CAPM can be derived from various sets of assumptions on primitives. For
our purposes, assume that each investor’s utility for risky consumption de-
pends only on the mean and variance; speciﬁcally, investor i’s utility function
for state-dependent wealth x is
U




where expectations and variances are computed with respect to the true prob-
abilities, and bi is absolute risk aversion. We assume throughout that risk
aversion is suﬃciently small that the utility functions Ui are strictly mono-
tone in the range of feasible consumptions, or at least observed consumptions.
Because we allow consumption to be negative, and individual endowments
are portfolios of assets, this is enough to imply that CAPM holds.6





the market portfolio of risky assets, and m = m/I for the per capital portfolio

















6In the usual CAPM, all assets can be sold short, while in our framework the risky
assets A,B cannot be sold short. However, in Appendix A of ? we show that, given
the particular asset structure here, the restriction on short sales does not change the
conclusions.
16for the market risk aversion. Write p = (pA,pB) for the vector of prices of
risky assets. The pricing conclusion of CAPM is that the equilibrium price
of risky assets is given by the formula
˜ p = µ − Γ∆m
In our setting, we know equilibrium prices, expected dividends, asset
dividends and true probabilities, hence the covariance matrix, and the per
capita market portfolio but not individual risk aversiions. If CAPM pricing
held exactly, we could impute the market risk aversion by solving the pric-
ing formula for Γ. In our experiments, CAPM pricing does not hold exactly
(see Bossaerts, Plott & Zame (2005) for discussion of the distance of actual
pricing to CAPM pricing), but we can impute market risk aversion as the
best-ﬁtting Γ. Several possible notions of “best-ﬁtting” might be natural; we
use Generalized Least Squares, where weights are based on the dispersion of
individual holdings from the market portfolio; this is an economic measure
of distance used and discussed in more detail in Bossaerts, Plott & Zame
(2005). Figure 4 shows the imputed market risk aversion for all periods in all
experiments. Note that there is considerable variation across experiments,
and even within a given experiment; as we have noted earlier, subject pref-













































Figure 4: Imputed Market Risk Aversion: All Periods, All Experiments
184 Conclusion
We have argued here that the eﬀects of risk aversion in laboratory asset
markets are observable and signiﬁcant, that the observed eﬀects are in the
direction predicted by theory, and that these eﬀects are quantiﬁable.
A crucial feature of our experimental design is that there are two risky
assets, so that the realization of uncertainty has two separate, but correlated,
eﬀects, and it is this correlation that makes it possible to make quantitative
inferences about the eﬀects of risk aversion. This feature suggests an ap-
proach to understanding the ﬁndings of other laboratory environments in
which risk aversion may play a role. For example, in laboratory tests of auc-
tion theory, some deviations of observed behavior from theoretical predictions
may be interpreted failures of the theory — and hence may point to other
theories — or as eﬀects of risk aversion. Our work suggests that these com-
peting explanations might be disentangled by auctioning two objects whose
values are risky but correlated.
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